jad hatem
instance in the case of stars, light is never absent. In that event,
however, these are considered a ‘becoming’ light for which the bodies
are the support [hâmil]. This is to say that even though this light does
not originate from them, it remains in them (H, §109–110). From
whence does it originate, then? From a superior substance which is the
giver of lights (H, §110).
As far as incorporeal or pure [mahd] light is concerned, this does not
dwell in a body, and therefore does not call for a designation (H, §112).
That is to say that it is less to be seized by the senses than it is by
representation. Would it, therefore, be unconscious? No, answers
Suhrawardî:
Nothing that has an essence of which it is not unconscious is a being of
the night, for its essence is evident to it. It cannot be a dark state in
something else, since even the luminous state is not self-subsistent
light, let alone the dark state. Therefore, it is a pure incorporeal light
which cannot be shown.^4
In the margins of the self-phenomenality of representation – which
implies a gap – stands something else, an immediate self-seizure, a
subjectivity that is directly informed by itself, a seeing that does not
call for demonstration or deduction. We are, hence, in the vicinity of
Michel Henry’s philosophy. The Frenchman concedes luminosity to
transcendent phenomenality, whereas he reserves the metaphor of the
night for immanent phenomenality, the embrace of self-affection,
since it operates without any distance, hence without any visibility
(which seems more appropriate than a light that cannot be seen).
However, one can wonder whether the title phenomenality is ap-
propriate to an act of showing that does not call for light, even if it be
black. Can it be considered an act of showing? There is not even time
here for a gesture or the figuration of a forefinger. Self-affection’s
absolute is given in one single blow each time. It is appropriate to
make sure of the validity of the comparison – to know, in other words,
whether the Persian truly refuses a transcendent phenomenality. The
text continues in this way:
- H, §114; Suhrawardî, The Philosophy of Illumination, Provo; BYU Press, 1999, 79
[mod].