12 Leaders The Economist January 15th 2022
“A
ll hindusmust pick up weapons and conduct a clean
liness drive,” bellowed a Hindu priest at a threeday “reli
gious parliament” in north India last month. Another speaker
fired up the large crowd even more crudely: “If a hundred of us
become soldiers and kill two million of them, we will be vic
torious.” By “them”, she meant India’s 200m Muslims.
Those priests baying for blood are not isolated bigots. Under
the Hindunationalist government of Narendra Modi, the
world’s most populous democracy has seen a growing wave of
intolerance (see Asia section). In Gurgaon, a satellite city of Del
hi, Muslims have been denied the use of open space to pray be
cause it “offends sentiments”. They have also been denied per
mission to build mosques. Elsewhere Muslims accused of trans
porting cattle for slaughter, or of being in possession of beef, are
sometimes lynched. Muslim businesses are boycotted. In recent
months young Hindu radicals have persecuted highprofile
Muslim women by creating apps to “auction” them off.
Muslims are not the only target of Hindu chauvinism. In Va
ranasi, a Hindu temple town, posters warn nonHindus to stay
away. Attacks on Christians, a tiny minority, have risen in recentyears. Last week, after Mr Modi, the prime minister, was briefly
delayed on an overpass in Sikhmajority Punjab, people associ
ated with his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp) warned darkly of
a repeat of 1984, when thousands of Sikhs were killed in po
groms after the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh body
guards. In an index of societal discrimination against minorities
compiled by Bar Ilan University in Israel, India scores worse
than Saudi Arabia and no better than Iran. It is impossible to
know the number of hate crimes in the country: independent
trackers were shut down in 2017 and 2019, and the government
stopped collecting data in 2017.
Another reason to worry is the silence of the government.
From the prime minister downwards, no senior figure has con
demned the drumbeat of incitement. When asked about it by the
bbc, one bjppolitician ripped off his microphone and stomped
off. Academics, bureaucrats and retired army officers have sent
anxious pleas to Mr Modi to appeal for calm. Yet only one unim
portant official—the vicepresident—has spoken up.
With big elections due next month, the mood could grow
even more fissile. Senior bjpofficials stop short of urging peopleThe ruling party is unleashing forces it will not be able to controlStop inciting murder
Indiawas seen as a mere placeman, installed to defend the system
built by his longserving predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev. It
was Mr Nazarbayev whom the chanting demonstrators de
nounced, and it is Mr Nazarbayev who has been most obviously
weakened by the turmoil. His allies have been accused of hijack
ing the protests for their own ends, and sacked from senior gov
ernment jobs; he himself was removed as chairman of the po
werful nationalsecurity council. It is just about possible that
the mildly reformist Mr Tokayev might now find himself freer to
clean up the crooked state Mr Nazarbayev bequeathed him.
By the same token, although Mr Putin is doubtless flattered to
be asked to pose as kingmaker, Kazakhstan and indeed all of
Central Asia are much more likely to be a source
of problems for him than of prestige. For one
thing, there had been speculation that he might
eventually try to emulate Mr Nazarbayev and
craft a form of retirement that would protect his
interests and those of his cronies. Mr Nazar
bayev’s troubles suggest that will be hard.
What is more, the internecine battles among
the Kazakh elite hint at how unmanageable
Central Asia is. The region is a fissiparous one, with many lan
guages and ethnicities, all jumbled up in a whorl of arbitrary So
viet boundaries. Although most of Central Asia’s 75m people are
at least nominally Muslim, their governments are largely secu
lar, and afraid that the pious might rally against them.
For all their considerable differences, the five Central Asian
countries depend on exports of commodities and labourers,
with the wild economic swings and entrenched corruption that
these things so often bring. All are plagued by mafias of one sort
or another. And all are run by authoritarian regimes of widely
varying degrees of brittleness and brutality (see Briefing). The
tarnished transition from Mr Nazarbayev to Mr Tokayev is aboutas close as the region has come to a peaceful handover of power.
Many Central Asian states are crying out for better rulers, re
gardless of Mr Putin’s misgivings. The madcap dictator of Turk
menistan, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, ordered dark cars
removed from the streets of the capital because he considers
white a lucky colour. He spends his country’s dwindling rev
enues from oil and gas on white elephants, while staple foods
run short. Kyrgyzstan’s president, Sadyr Japarov, was serving a
prison sentence for kidnapping until 2020, when a mob freed
him and propelled him to power. Emomali Rahmon, Tajikistan’s
leader, styles himself “founder of peace and national unity, lead
er of the nation” and is grooming his son to succeed him.
The good news is that change is possible.
Since taking over from a textbook strongman in
2016, the president of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mir
ziyoyev, although no democrat, has abolished
slave labour, allowed ordinary citizens more
personal freedom and tried to modernise the
economy. There were hopes that, under Mr To
kayev, the comparatively outwardlooking Kaz
akhstan would follow suit—as it still might.
China has poured money into infrastructure, including pipe
lines, leaving Central Asia less dependent on Russia, at least eco
nomically. But popular resentment at China’s internment of
Muslims in nearby Xinjiang makes close ties awkward.
The more that other countries are involved in the region, the
easier it will be for Central Asian governments to stand alone.
The West should certainly not write the ’Stans off, not only be
cause they occupy a strategic spot, between China and Russia,
and are a source of commodities, such as uranium. More impor
tant still, Western involvement could help the regions’ moder
nisers gain the upper hand over the autocrats. Thatwould be
good for Central Asia and the world, if not for Mr Putin.n