The Economist January 15th 2022 Asia 33D
isputes in theSouth China Sea go
back decades. They involve Brunei,
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan
and Vietnam, all with contesting claims.
But it was only ten years ago that China,
which makes outlandish maritime
claims for nearly the whole sea, greatly
upped the ante. First, it provoked a
standoff that left it in control of an
uninhabited atoll, Scarborough Shoal,
which under unmaritime law clearly
belongs to the Philippines, sitting within
that country’s 200nauticalmile “exclu
sive economic zone” (eez). Then China
launched a massive terraforming exer
cise, turning reefs and rocks into artifi
cial islands hosting airstrips and bases.
What, a decade on, has China accom
plished, apart from the wilful destruc
tion of unique ecosystems?
The terraforming in the sea is over. Xi
Jinping, China’s president, claimed its
purpose was to benefit all—bolstering
navigational safety for commercial ship
ping, for instance—and that the new
islands had no military purpose. The
claims are bunkum. The artificial islands
host runways for longdistance bombers,
reinforced bunkers, missile batteries and
military radar. The longterm aim, say
regional diplomats and analysts, is to
project Chinese power deep into the
South China Sea and beyond, and to hold
the Americans away during any conflict.
The immediate aim, though, is to
dominate politically and economically
as much as militarily. Here, the new
bases help not through the deployment
of hard power but with “greyzone”
coercion of neighbours. Coastguard,
survey vessels and “maritime militias”
all play their part. The latter are fleets
supposedly involved in commercial
fishing but in reality working alongside
Chinese military and lawenforcementoperations in disputed waters.
Last March 200odd Chinese fishing
boats swarmed the Whitsun Reef, within
the Philippine eez. Today, some 300 mili
tia vessels are present around the Spratly
Islands, in the heart of the South China
Sea, on any given day, writes Gregory
Poling of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, a thinktank in
Washington. China has challenged oil
andgas activity by both Indonesia and
Malaysia, and sent drilling rigs to both
countries’ eezs and continental shelves. It
has bullied foreign energy companies into
dropping joint development with Vietnam
and others, while offering neighbours the
carrot of joint development with itself—
once its claims are recognised.
China has paid a diplomatic price. Had
Mr Xi engaged in none of the terraforming
and bullying, China would be better ad
mired among members of the tencountry
Association of SouthEast Asian Nations
(asean). The Whitsun Reef swarming led
President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philip
pines to abandon his wooing of Mr Xi and
hold America closer. The United Statesand its Western allies have upped their
naval presence in the sea, welcomed by
most aseanmembers. Yet China acts as
if time is on its side—it is, after all, the
region’s indispensable economic partn
er. Sooner or later, it calculates, one
country will break from the pack and
agree to a Chinese jointdevelopment
project within its own eez, thus ceding to
China’s wild claims of sovereignty.
Still, appearances count. For years
China dragged its feet on agreeing with
aseana code of conduct on the South
China Sea, a principle agreed on 20 years
ago in order to promote cooperation and
reduce tensions. These days, China likes
to play willing. Not least, says Ian Storey
of the iseasYusof Ishak Institute, a
thinktank in Singapore, it reinforces
China’s narrative that it and its neigh
bours are managing differences without
interference by America and its friends.
In 2021—hold your breath—a preamble to
the code was at last agreed on. This year,
China says, a code may at last be signed.
In fact the two sides are as far apart as
ever. China is demanding, in effect, the
right of veto over aseanmembers’ naval
exercises with foreign powers. It also
wants to keep out foreigners from joint
oilandgas development. Such demands
are unacceptable to members.
So why, Western policymakers impa
tiently ask, does aseanpersist with the
charade of negotiating a code? One
SouthEast Asian ambassador replies
that dialogue with the giant neighbour is
far better than none, and in this arena
aseancan politely push back whenever
China tries its luck. Moreover, the am
bassador adds, asean’s Lilliputians can
ensnare China in an endless web of
dialogue. That might curb some of its
worst excesses. Meanwhile, a stalemate
has settled on the South China Sea. Despite its dominance, China does not have it all its way in the South China SeaBanyan Treading water
Hollywood, isolating in mansions instead
of quarantine hotels. That infuriated locals
who were separated from their families for
months or years on end.
When Mr Djokovic announced that he
had been granted permission to fly to Aus
tralia, many were incandescent. Why
should an antivaxxing superstar get spe
cial treatment, they demanded. Some still
want to send him packing. Mr Djokovic’s
appeal revealed to ruleabiding Australians
that he had flouted pandemic restrictions.
He was caught out for conducting a face
toface interview two days after he was di
agnosed with covid on December 16th, and
for making a false declaration in a legally
binding Australian travel form. The second
mistake, he says, was a “human error” by
the agent who submitted the document.
For Australian politicians, talking
tough about the border is usually a vote
winner. Mr Morrison, a former immigra
tion minister responsible for sending asy
lumseekers to offshore detention centres,
takes a hard line on “illegal arrivals”. He
has plenty of reason to play it up. A federal
election is due by May and his government
is trailing in the polls. Yet detaining the world number one
twice would send an odd signal to the
world. The saga has already set off a dip
lomatic incident with Serbia. And it might
suggest Australia’s government is overrul
ing the courts. The ministerial powers be
stowed on Mr Hawke were designed to turf
out terrorists and criminals, says Mr Rizvi,
who helped design them. Using them
against a sportsman would be “entirely in
appropriate”, he says. Mr Morrison’s gov
ernment has left itself with no goodop
tions. Whatever it does, Australians are
likely to find fault—and doublefault.n