The Economist - USA (2022-01-15)

40 Middle East & Africa TheEconomistJanuary15th 2022

RussiaandAfrica

Wagner, worse than itsounds

A

s hehandedovera largewoodenkey

on  December  14th,  a  French  colonel

symbolically  passed  control  of  a  military

base  in  Timbuktu  to  his  Malian  counter­

part.  The  tricolore,  which  had  flown  over

the  camp  in  northern  Mali  since  France

sent  troops  there  in  2013  to  counter  jiha­

dists and separatists, was replaced by a Ma­

lian  flag.  The  ceremony  marked  a  mile­

stone in a French plan to cut by almost half

its 5,100­strong counter­terrorism force in

the region, as it refocuses on training and

supporting  local  troops  in  their  battle

against  the  extremists  who  have  overrun

swathes  of  Mali,  Niger  and  Burkina  Faso.

Yet soon after the French had left, a contin­

gent of Russians moved in.

They  are  but  one  element  of  a  Russian

force  that  is  perhaps  450­strong,  says  a

French  military  official,  who  adds  that

most are mercenaries from Wagner Group.

This is a company founded by Yevgeny Pri­

gozhin,  a  crony  of  President  Vladimir  Pu­

tin.  It  is  reportedly  being  paid  $10m  a

month in Mali, much of it under a goons­

for­gold deal. Mali’s government insists it

has  no  hired  guns  fighting  for  it  and  that

the Russians are there as trainers officially

sent by their government. Yet armed Rus­

sians have been seen in several parts of the

country. Jihadists may have recently killed

one and wounded two more. 

Mr Putin has no interest in helping Afri­

ca become more peaceful or democratic. A

key aim is to stick it to the West, says Oleg

Ignatov, who is based in Moscow for Inter­

national  Crisis  Group,  a  think­tank.  And

Mr Putin appears to be doing so with canny

opportunism, deploying small numbers of

fighters  to  prop  up  wobbly  authoritarians

or  governments  that  are  annoyed  by  the

West. The French official reckons that Rus­

sia’s aim is to drive France and its allies out

of  Mali,  leaving  Russia  “alone  to  exploit

and  deploy  their  influence”.  How  to  re­

spond? That, he says, is a “major question”. 

Part of the difficulty is that Mali is a per­

fect  target  for  Russian  influence.  Colonel

Assimi  Goïta,  who  runs  the  country,  top­

pled Mali’s elected president in mid­2020.

He then installed himself as president with

a second coup last year. His junta, some of

whose  members  were  trained  in  Russia,

had  promised  to  hold  elections  in  Febru­

ary.  But  then  it  said  it  would  postpone

them, perhaps until December 2025. 

That was a step too far for Mali’s neigh­

bours. On January 9th members of the Eco­

nomic  Community  of  West  African  States

(ecowas), a regional bloc, closed their bor­

ders  with  Mali  and  imposed  tough  finan­

cial  sanctions  on  it,  supported  by  France,

Britain  and  America.  Russia  backed  the

junta  and  blocked  a  unSecurity  Council

resolution supporting sanctions. 

Russia’s  strategy  in  Mali  draws  on  the

game plan it used in the Central African Re­

public,  a  failed  state  that  might  have  de­

scended  into  genocide  in  2013  had  France

not  sent  in  peacekeepers.  After  handing

over  to  the  un’s  blue  helmets,  France

brought most of its troops home in 2016. 

That opened the door to Mr Putin. Hav­

ing previously blocked efforts by France to

arm  government  forces,  Russia  changed

tackandofferedtoarmthemitself.Merce­

nariesfromWagnersoonshowedupanda

Wagner­linkedcompanywonconcessions

tominegoldanddiamonds.Thoughthe

unhasaccusedtheRussianmercenariesof

murdering,torturing andrapingpeople,

thathasnotdimmedthehostregime’sar­

dour. InNovemberitmadetheRussian

language a compulsory subject for stu­

dentsattheuniversityinBangui,thecapi­

tal—thefirsttimesincethecoldwarthat

learningRussianhasbeenobligatoryout­

sidetheformerSovietUnion.

Russia, which is already the biggest

arms supplier to sub­Saharan Africa, is

widening its security ties. Last year it

signed military co­operationdeals with

Ethiopia andNigeria, Africa’s two most

populous countries. Ethiopia’s govern­

mentisangeredbyWesterncriticismof

atrocitiesinitscivilwar;Nigeria’sleaders

aregrumpythatAmericapausedanarms

saleoverhuman­rightsabusesbyNigerian

forces.InSudan,Russiatookadvantageof

politicalturmoiltostrikea dealfora naval

base,thoughit hasyettomaterialise.

NextonRussia’slistmaywellbeBurki­

naFaso,whereonJanuary11ththegovern­

ment said it had thwarted a coup plot. Al­

ready  a  buyer  of  Russian  helicopters  and

weapons, Burkina Faso has also been bom­

barded by pro­Russian propaganda on so­

cial  media.  In  November  a  French  army

convoy  was  repeatedly  blocked  by  protes­

ters—some  waving  Russian  flags—chant­

ing “down with France”.

Yet  Russia’s  mercenaries  will  probably

find it no easier to battle jihadists than do

the Western forces they hope to supplant.

Their  record  is  certainly  uninspiring.  In

2019 Wagner sent men to fight jihadists in

northern  Mozambique.  It  pulled  out  after

about  ten  of  them  were  killed,  including

some who were beheaded. In Libya roughly

1,200  Wagner  men  fought  on  the  side  of  a

rebel  general,  Khalifa  Haftar,  against  the

un­recognised  government.  Yet  the  rebel

push  to  topple  the  government  failed  and

Wagner’s  troops  were  accused  of  war

crimes,  including  murdering  prisoners

and civilians. 

Even  if  the  Russians  cannot  beat  the

jihadists, Mr Goïta may still want them to

coup­proof  his  regime.  (He  narrowly  sur­

vived a knife attack last July.) Yet in prop­

ping  him  up,  or  even  simply  in  failing  to

beat  the  extremists,  Wagner  risks  having

the population turn against it—and Russia.

In  2013  François  Hollande,  then  France’s

president,  was  mobbed  by  cheering

crowds in Timbuktu after his forces liber­

ated the city. Today its deputy mayor, Bocar

Touré, complains that the French failed to

improve  security.  “The  Russians  can  help

more  than  the  French  did,’‘  he  says.  But,

perhaps  foreshadowing  the  nextwave  of

anger, he adds: “I would prefernottohave

any foreign forces in Timbuktu.”n

DAKAR AND MOSCOW

How mercenaries are extending Russia’s reachinAfrica

MALI

BURKINA

FASO

NIGER

LIBYA

NIGERIA

CAR

SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

MOZAMBIQUE

Timbuktu

Dakar

Bangui

SAHEL

2,000 km

Sticking it to the West