44 Europe The Economist January 15th 2022
Gasnightmares
I
n george orwell’s“1984”, Room 101 is where prisoners are con
fronted with their worst fear. Finding Europeans’ prevailing
phobia is trickier: what spooks voters in one bit of the continent
(asylumseekers! deficits! Russia!) may be of scant concern to
those on the other end. Covid19 is one contender, as it has made
life dull from Dublin to Dubrovnik and beyond. Another is the
continent’s ongoing energy crisis. Surging naturalgas prices are
sending heating bills soaring, soaking up the cash Europeans have
saved while moping around at home for two years. It is a crisis so
allencompassing that all parts of the euwill have to face up to
their deepest apprehensions.
As with most nightmares, the origins of the power crunch are
partly clear and partly mysterious. Europe went into the winter
season with low stocks of natural gas, which is used for heating
homes and generating electricity. Shrinking domestic energy pro
duction in places like the Netherlands, wimpy breezes that failed
to spin wind turbines as much as hoped, booming Asian demand
sucking gas eastwards, and maintenance trouble at French nuc
lear plants have coalesced into a shortage few saw coming. When
Russia, whence gas pipelines tend to depart, did not rush to help
with additional supply, prices spiked. The average European
household faces electricity and gas bills of €1,850 ($2,100) in 2022,
up from €1,200 in 2020, according to Bank of America. Fears of
winter power cuts have been forestalled by a bout of unseasonably
warm weather—for now.
But the horror goes beyond the pocketbook: for many coun
tries, it evokes their worst insecurities. Take proud France, which
currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the eu.
The crisis makes a mockery of the bloc attaining “strategic autono
my”, President Emmanuel Macron’s latest big idea. That Europe
should be shielded from being bossed around by foreign powers
sounds laudable, but seems more distant than ever. What autono
my can Europe claim when it requires Russian largesse to keep its
homes warm? This is an awkward question at a time when Vladi
mir Putin is threatening to invade Ukraine. If America responds
with sanctions against Russia, as it has threatened, it is Europe
that will suffer the worst of the Kremlin’s retribution. No wonder
the eucan scarcely find a seat at the negotiating table. Worse, some countries seem sanguine at the existing state of
affairs. Germany is in the final stages of signing off on Nord
Stream 2, a pipeline that will make Europe even more reliant on
Russian gas. The eu’s biggest economy will have to confront angst
of its own. The energyprice surge will be disastrous for its indus
try. It has also triggered a jump in inflation, the economic indica
tor Germans fear most. And the new coalition government, which
is divided over Nord Stream 2, has just overseen the closure of
three nuclearpower plants that might have come in handy in
keeping the continent’s lights on. The country that thinks of itself
as providing solutions for Europe is now part of the problem.
Twin dreads keep northern Europeans awake through their
long winter nights. One is that the euwill fail to act against cli
mate change, which greatly concerns voters in the Netherlands
and Scandinavia. The other is that “their” money will go to subsi
dise spendthrift southerners. The deal struck in 2020 for a Euro
pean covid recovery fund neatly set these two fears against each
other: frugal northerners agreed to underwrite a big aid package,
on the condition it fund longterm investments (notably green
ones). The gas crisis undermines that setup. Governments in
places like Italy and Spain are doling out billions to help house
holds handle higher utility bills, while Polish miners work over
time to dig up filthy coal.
Southern Europe’s biggest fear is of a sputtering recovery.
Greece, Italy and others could use a good run after two crises in
barely more than a decade. Big jumps in energy bills hurt poorer
countries more. That applies to eastern Europeans too. But their
Room 101 is dominated by Mr Putin, who keeps his hand on the gas
tap while demanding that former Warsaw Pact countries stop
hosting nato troops. If winter temperatures don’t have Baltic
countries shivering, the prospect of a hockeymasked Mr Putin
picking them off like terrified teens surely will. Pump scare
The gasprice horror movie is most terrifying for Eurocrats. The
causes of the current energy snafu are hard to distildown to a sin
gle factor, says Georg Zachmann of Bruegel, a thinktank in Brus
sels. That leaves plenty of room to designate a scapegoat, and one
candidate comes to mind. The European Commission regulates
euenergy markets (mostly quite sensibly) and has made carbon
neutrality a central plank of the bloc’s future (also sensible).
Sound as its policy decisions may be, they have aggravated the cur
rent crisis. For example, shifting to coal to keep prices down is less
of an option, since it would require buying expensive eucarbon
emissions credits.
Had Britain still been in the eu, the likes of Nigel Farage would
no doubt have spent the past few months blaming Brussels for ris
ing energy costs. Others might seize his demagogic mantle.
France, home of the gilets jaunes, has recent experience of grass
roots grumpiness linked to energy prices, and is gearing up for an
election featuring some raucous eurobashers. Viktor Orban will
also be looking for some element of the eumachine to pummel as
he prepares to face Hungarian voters in April.
European officials know the spotlight of blame might swing to
them, and are not looking forward to it. Yet anxiety can be healthy
when the fear is of being held accountable. Having voters fume at
the eu’s approach to problems is a sign that it is devising policies
some people disagreewith,and might want overturned. That
looks an awful lot likea functional democracy at a panEuropean
level. Scary, isn’t it? Boo!nCharlemagne
A protracted energy crisis will trigger Europe’s neuroses