132 Derrida 1963–1983
from the bench as soon as summoned to it by Descartes – this
last tribunal of a Cogito that, by its essence, could not possibly
be mad.^15However partial it might appear, the reading of this passage none-
theless involved a great deal in Derrida’s view. If we are to believe
him, in fact, ‘the sense of Foucault’s entire project can be pinpointed
in these few allusive and somewhat enigmatic pages’. Following the
fi rst of Descartes’s Metaphysical Meditations word for word, and
going back to the original Latin, Derrida patiently and methodically
questioned the reading that Foucault had proposed. And little by
little, many of the book’s postulates, including the very defi nition of
madness, were cast into doubt or undermined by his analysis.
Foucault’s fi rst reaction was really rather positive. He seemed
ready to take on board Derrida’s critique, without any hint of the
violent polemic that would break out nine years later.
The other day, as you can imagine, I wasn’t able to thank you in
the way I would have wished: not really, not only for the over-
indulgent things you said about me, but for the immense and
marvellous attention you gave to my words. I was impressed- so much so that, off the cuff , I was taken aback and pretty
clumsy in what I managed to say – by the rectitude of your
remarks that went, unerringly, to the heart of what I wanted
to do, and beyond it. This relationship between the Cogito and
madness is something that, without the least doubt, I treated
too cavalierly in my thesis: via Bataille and Nietzsche, I came
back to it slowly and by way of many detours. You have magis-
terially showed the right road to take: and you can understand
why I owe you a profound debt of gratitude.
It would be wonderful to see you again [.. .] as soon as
you like. And please believe in my deepest and most faithful
friendship.^16
A few months later, Foucault was still reassuring Derrida,
although in a more nuanced way, when the question arose of pub-
lishing the text of the latter’s paper in the Revue de métaphysique et
de morale: ‘As for your text being published, in the fi nal analysis I
think it’s a good thing (I’m here speaking egotistically): only the
blind will fi nd your critique severe.’^17 And after ‘re-reading with
passion’ the text in its published version, he said that he was again
‘convinced that it gets to the heart of things and in such a radical,
such an all-embracing way that it simultaneously leaves me in an
aporia and opens up to me a whole way of thinking that I hadn’t
thought of’.^18 These friendly relations were to last for several years.
We will later discover how and why they deteriorated.