culture: being of proper descent, enjoying the approval of the
gods, taking the leading role in the cult, and promoting the
economic well-being and security of his subjects.
Historical writings frequently condemn past kings for fail-
ure in these domains, and public support of a ruler waned if his
performance was considered inadequate. A case in point is the
Babylonian king Nabonidus (r. 556–539 b.c.e.), who promoted
the moon god Sin at the expense of other gods. He stayed in
Arabia for a number of years, and this resulted in an inter-
ruption of the annual festival in honor of Marduk, the head of
the Babylonian pantheon, for which the king had to lead the
ceremonies in person. Th is resulted in popular disaff ection,
particularly in the circles of the Marduk clergy, and Naboni-
dus himself refers to the animosity of the residents of Babylon
as one of his reasons for leaving the capital. Open criticism of
his religious politics, however, fi rst appears under his succes-
sor, the Persian king Cyrus II (r. 539–ca. 529 b.c.e.), and it is
possible that the extent of popular discontent was deliberately
exaggerated to defend the legitimacy of the new dynasty.
While good rulership was thought to promote the well-
being of society, national setbacks cast a shadow over the
suitability of the king. Public dissatisfaction could even cul-
minate in his disposal, as is suggested by such omen pre-
dictions of the diviners as “his own city will rebel against
the king” and “the eldest of his city will dismiss the king”—
though incidents of this kind did not oft en come to pass.
Most dynasties, however, were stable because the king could
rely on the continuous support of powerful servants whose
fortunes were tied closely to their lord. Th ey owed him abso-
lute obedience, backed by oaths of loyalty, and in return en-
joyed the king’s favors and the material benefi ts that derived
from it. Given the very personal nature of this relationship,
members of the top tiers of the administrative hierarchy
were at risk of losing their positions and having their re-
wards revoked if a rival king ascended the throne, and it was
their collective intent to support their ruler through periods
of adversity.
Paradoxically, the most dangerous forms of internal op-
position arose from the same class of royal servants. Essential
functions at the court and the provincial administrative cen-
ters were fulfi lled by powerful dignitaries who were eager to
increase their share of royal favors, infl uence, and wealth at
the expense of other members of the elite. Th ey typically al-
lied together to attain these goals. Now and then dignitaries
were able to build up suffi cient support to assassinate the king
and claim the throne, but normally they chose to promote
their preferred candidate among the king’s potential heirs.
Some political systems, such that of the Neo-Assyrian Dy-
nasty (ca. 1000–626 b.c.e.), did not adhere to the principle of
succession by the fi rstborn son but allowed the king to select
his heir or even change his mind more than once during the
course of his reign. Court factions threw in their lot with a
particular candidate in expectation of future rewards, and
the presence of more than one contender with suffi cient sup-
port led to internal struggle or even civil war.
A particularly fi erce episode started toward the end of
the reign of the Assyrian king Shalmaneser III (r. 858–824
b.c.e.), when prince Assur-da’in-aplu, who had been passed
over for succession, led the heartland of the Assyrian state
in a rebellion against the designated crown price, Shamshi-
Adad V (r. 824–811 b.c.e.). Aft er fi ve years of civil war the
crown prince managed, with the support of the outer prov-
inces, to defeat his rival and reunite the realm. Th at both
contenders depended on separate domains indicates that
members of the old aristocracy supported their respective
candidates for the throne.
Given the potentially devastating consequences of fac-
tional struggle, kings dealt carefully with powerful clans
among their servants. Th ey tried to break up interest groups
by cautionary punishments of disloyal servants and rewards
to those who reported the culpable acts of others; some kings
did not hesitate to have large numbers of their highest ser-
vants executed. Powerful kings were in this way able to en-
force the personal dependence of their direct entourage, and
they depended on the top of the state apparatus to enforce
loyalty at the lower tiers of the system.ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BY UFFE BERGETON AND MICHAEL J. O’NEAL
Just as political power and state control are inextricably inter-
twined with ideolog y, so also are the ways in which resistance
and dissent can be conceived and expressed. From the earliest
period of Chinese history for which we have extensive writ-
ten documents, that is, the Western Zhou (1045–771 b.c.e.),
the world was thought of as a hierarchical pyramid with the
highest deity, Heaven (Tian), at the top, followed by his hu-
man counterpart, the king as the son of Heaven (Tian Zi);
the royal vassals; and the lower ranks of nobility down to the
common people. Some of the earliest expressions of social
protest are found in the Shi jing (Book of Songs), a collection
of anonymous poems from the Western Zhou and Spring and
Autumn Periods (722–481 b.c.e.).
At the time of Confucius (551–479 b.c.e.) rulers were
still born into power, but whether they retained it depended
on whether they could keep the mandate of Heaven, which
was bestowed or taken away by Heaven based on their moral
virtue (de). In the Spring and Autumn Periods increasingly
large state administrations demanding specialized admin-
istrative skills gave rise to a relatively independent class of
scholar-offi cials (shi). Before Confucius, moral authority and
charismatic power (de) had been concentrated in the hands of
the son of Heaven, who had the most direct access to divine
powers. Confucius’s most important innovation was to shift
the locus of moral and religious authority from being an ex-
clusive royal prerogative to being accessible to any individual,
regardless of birth, who was able to purify his charismatic
virtue through self-cultivation.
Th us, in the emerging shi class, engaging in self-cultiva-
tion, the ground was laid for a class of political “dissenters,”resistance and dissent: Asia and the Pacific 873