UN job, arguing that there "was a dirth [sic] of Nixon advocacy in New York City and
the general New York area that he could fill that need in the New York social circles he
would be moving in as Ambassador. [fn 4] Nixon's UN Ambassador had been Charles
Yost, a Democrat who was now leaving. But the White House had already offered that
job to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who had accepted. But, apparently a few hours after the
Bush-Nixon meeting, word came in that Moynihan was not interested.
But then Moynihan decided that he did not want the UN ambassador post after all, and,
with a sigh of relief, the White House offered it to Bush. Bush's appointment was
announced on December 11, Connally's on December 14." [fn 5] In offering the post to
Bush, Haldemann had been brutally frank, telling him that the job, although of cabinet
rank, would have no power attached to it. Bush, stressed Haldemann, would be taking
orders directly from Kissinger. "I commented that even if somebody who took the job
didn't understand that, Henry Kissinger would give him a twenty-four hour crash course
on the subject," Bush says he replied. [fn 6]
Nixon told his cabinet and the Republican Congressional leadership on December 14,
1970 what had been in the works for some time, that Connally was "coming not only as a
Democrat but as Secretary of the Treasury for the next two full years." [fn 7] Even more
humiliating for Bush was the fact that our hero had been on the receiving end of
Connally's assistance. As Nixon told the cabinet: "Connally said he wouldn't take it until
George Bush got whatever he was entitled to. I don't know why George wanted the UN
appointment, but he wanted it so he got it." Only this precondition from Connally,by
implication, had finally prompted Nixon to take care of poor George. Nixon turned to
Senator Tower, who was in the meeting: "This is hard for you. I am for every Republican
running. We need John Tower back in 1972." Tower replied: "I'm a pragmatic man. John
Connally is philosophically attuned to you. He is articulate and persuasive. I for one will
defend him against those in our own party who may not like him." [fn 8]
There is evidence that Nixon considered Connally to be a possible successor in the
presidency. Connally's approach to the international monetary crisis then unfolding was
that "all foreigners are out to screw us and it's our job to screw them first," as he told C.
Fred Bergsten of Kissinger's NSC staff. Nixon's bumbling management of the
international monetary crisis was one of the reasons why he was Watergated, and Big
Jawn was certainly seen by the financiers as a big part of the problem. Bush was
humiliated in this episode, but that is nothing compared to what later happened to both
Connally and Nixon. Connally would be indicted while Bush was in Peking, and later he
would face the further humilation of personal bankruptcy. In the view of James Reston,
Jr., "George Bush was to maintain a smoldering, visceral dislike of Connally, one that
lasted well into the 1980's." [fn 9] As others discovered during the Gulf war, Bush is
vindictive.
Bush appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his pro forma and
perfunctory confirmation hearings on February 8, 1971. It was a free ride. Many of the
senators had known Prescott Bush, and several were still Prescott's friends. Acting like
friends of the family, they gave Bush friendly advice with a tone that was congratulatory