167 out of 169 seats in the east. Yahya Khan delayed the seating of the new national
assembly and on the evening of March 25 ordered the Pakistani army to arrest Mujibur
and to wipe out his organization in East Pakistan. The army proceeded to launch a
campaign of political genocide in East Pakistan. Estimates of the number of victims range
from 500,000 to three million dead. All members of the Awami League, all Hindus, all
students and intellectuals were in danger of execution by roving army patrols. A senior
US Foreign Service officer sent home a depatch in which he told of West Pakistani
soldiers setting fire to a women's dormitory at the University of Dacca and then machine-
gunning the women when they were forced by the flames to run out. This campaign of
killing went on until December, and it generated an estimated 10 million refugees, most
of whom fled across the nearby borders to India, which had territory all around East
Pakistan. The arrival of ten million refugees caused indescribable chaos in India, whose
government was unable to prevent untold numbers from starving to death. [fn 14]
From the very beginning of this monumental genocide, Kissinger and Nixon made it clear
that they would not condemn Yahya Khan, whom Nixon considered a personal friend.
Kissinger referred merely to the "strong -arm tactics of the Pakistani military," and Nixon
circulated a memo in his own handwriting saying "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at
this time. RN" Nixon stressed repeatedly that he wanted to "tilt" in favor of Pakistan in
the crisis.
One level of explanation for this active complicity in genocide was that Kissinger and
Nixon regarded Yahya Khan as their indispensable back channel to Peking. But Kissinger
could soon go to Peking anytime he wanted, and soon he could talk to the Chinese UN
delegate in one of the CIA's New York safe houses. The essence of the support for the
butcher Yahya Khan was this: in 1962 India and China had engaged in a brief border war,
and the Peking leaders regarded India as their geopolitical enemy. In order to ingratiate
himself with Chou and Mao, Kissinger wanted to take a position in favor of Pakistan, and
therefore of Pakistan's ally China, and against India and against India's ally, the USSR.
(Shortly after Kissinger's trip to China had taken place and Nixon had announced his
intention to go to Peking, India and the USSR had signed a twenty year friendship treaty.
In Kissinger's view, the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Bengal was sure to become a Sino-
Soviet clash by proxy, and he wanted the United States aligned with China in order to
impress Peking with the vast benefits to be derived from the US-PRC strategic alliance
under the heading of the "China card."
Kissinger and Nixon were isolated within the Washington bureaucracy on this issue.
Secretary of State Rogers was very reluctant to go on supporting Pakistan, and this was
the prevalent view in Foggy Bottom and in the embassies around the world. Tricky Dick
and Fat Henry were isolated from the vast majority of Congressional opinion, which
expressed horror and outrage over the extent of the carnage being carried out week after
week, month after month, by Yahya Khan's armed forces. Even the media and US public
opinion could not find any reason for the friendly "tilt" in favor of Yahya Khan. On July
31, Kissinger exploded at a meeting of the Senior Review Group when a proposal was
made that the Pakistani army could be removed from Bengal. "Why is it our business