On the same day, an NBC camera team filmed much of Nixon's day inside the White
House. Part of what was recorded, and later broadcast, was a telephone call from Nixon
to George Bush at the United Nations, giving Bush his instructions on how to handle the
India-Pakistan crisis. "Some, all over the world, will try to make this basically a political
issue," said Nixon to Bush. "You've got to do what you can. More important than
anything else now is to get the facts out with regard to what we have done, that we have
worked for a political settlement, what we have done for the refugees and so forth and so
on. If you see that some here in the Senate and House, for whatever reason, get out and
misrepresent our opinions, I want you to hit it frontally, strongly, and toughly; is that
clear? Just take the gloves off and crack it, because you know exactly what we have done,
OK?" [fn 16]
December 7- George Bush at the UN made a further step forward towards global
confrontation by branding India as the aggressor in the crisis, as Kissinger approvingly
notes in his memoirs. Bush's draft resolution described above, which had been vetoed by
Malik the in Security Council, was approved by the General assembly by a non-binding
vote of 104 to 11, which Kissinger considered a triumph for Bush. But on the same day
Yahya Khan informed the government in Washington that his military forces in east
Pakistan were rapidly disintegrating. Kissinger and Nixon seized on a dubious report
from an alleged CIA agent at a high level in the Indian Government which purported to
summarize recent remarks of Indira Gandhi to her cabinet. According to this report,
which may have come from the later Prime Minister Moraji Desai, Mrs. Gandhi had
pledged to conquer the southern part of Pakistani-held Kashmir. If the Chinese "rattled
the sword," the report quoted Mrs. Gandhi as saying, the Soviets would respond. This
unreliable report became one of the pillars for further actions by Nixon, Kissinger, and
Bush.
December 8- By this time the Soviet navy had some 21 ships either in or approaching the
Indian Ocean, in contrast to a pre-crisis level of 3 ships. At this point, with the Vietnam
war raging unabated, the US had a total of three ships in the Indian Ocean- two old
destroyers and a seaplane tender. The last squadron of the British navy was departing
from the region in the framework of the British pullout from east of Suez.
In the evening, Nixon suggested to Kissinger that the scheduled Moscow summit might
be cancelled. Kissinger raved that India wanted to detach not just Bengal, but Kashmir
also, leading to the further secession of Baluchistan and the total dismemberment og
Pakistan. "Fundamentally," wrote Kissinger of this moment, "our only card left was to
raise the risks for the Soviets to a level where Moscow would see larger interests
jeopardized" by its support of India, which had been lukewarm so far.
December 9-- The State Department and other agencies were showing signs of being
almost human, seeking to undermine the Nixon-Kissinger- Bush policy through
damaging leaks and bureaucratic obstructionism. Nixon, "beside himself" over the
damaging leaks, called in the principal officers of the Washington Special Action Group
and told them that while he did not insist on their being loyal to the President, they ought