Council resolutions of 1948, 1949, and 1950? If this is not India's intention, then a
prompt disavowal is required. The world has a right to know: What are India's intentions?
Pakistan's aims have become clear: It has accepted the General Assembly's resolution
passed by a vote of 104 to 11. My government has asked this question of the Indian
Government several times in the last week. I regret to inform the Council that India's
replies have been unsatisfactory and not reassuring."
"In view of India's defiance of world opinion expressed by such an overwhelming
majority, the United States is now returning the issue to the Security Council. With East
Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops, a continuation of the war would take on
increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a Member State of the
United Nations." [fn 22]
Bush introduced another draft resolution of pro-Pakistan tilt which called on the
governments of India and Pakistan to take measures for an immediate cease-fire and
withdrawl of troops, and for measures to help the refugees. This resolution was also
vetoed by the USSR.
December 14-- Kissinger shocked US public opinion by stating off the record to
journalists in a plane returning from a meeting with French President Georges Pompidou
in the Azores that if Soviet conduct continued in the present mode, the US was "prepared
to reevaluate our entire relationship, including the summit."
December 15--The Pakistani commander in East Pakistan, after five additional days of
pointless killing, again offered a cease-fire. Kissinger claimed that the five intervening
days had allowed the US to increase the pressure on India and prevent the Indian forces
from turning on West Pakistan.
December 16- Mrs, Gandhi offered an unconditional cease-fire in the west, which
Pakistan immedaitely accepted. Kissinger opined that this decision to end all fighting had
been "reluctant" on the part of India, and had been made possible through Soviet pressure
generated by US threats. Chou En-lai also said later that the US had saved West Pakistan.
Kissinger praised Nixon's "courage and patriotism" and his committment to "preserve the
balance of power for the ultimate safety of all free people." Apprentice geopolitician
George Bush had carried out yeoman service in that immoral cause.
After a self-serving and false description of the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1971, Kissinger
pontificates in his memoirs about the necessary priority of geopolitical machinations:
"There is in America an idealistic tradition that sees foreign policy as a context between
evil and good. There is a pragmatic tradition that seeks to solve 'problems' as they arise.
There is a legalistic tradition that treats international issues as juridical cases. There is no
geopolitical tradition." In their stubborn pursuit of an alliance with the second strongest
land power at the expense of all other considerations, Kissinger, Nixon, and Bush were
following the dictates of classic geopolitics. This is the school in which Bush was trained,
and this is how he has reacted to every international crisis down through the Gulf war,
which was originally conceived in London as a "geopolitical" adjustment in favor of the