and this body and all its members should be mindful of the need to preserve the
negotiating asset that it represents." "The assembly," Bush went on, "cannot seek to
impose courses of action on the countries directly concerned, either by making new
demands or favoring the proposals or positions of one side over the other." Never, never
would George Bush ever take sides or accept a double standard of this type. Bush did
claim that the US continued to support 242 and the Jarring mission. But Bush was
suggesting that Israel and Egypt begin talks under US mediation for an interim, bilateral
deal to re-open the Suez canal. Here we can observe the policy thrust which culminated
in Camp David not so many years later, after the 1973 war had been fought..
An interesting document of this period is the text of secret conversations between Bush
and the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the between Bush and the Israeli Foreign Minister.
These conversations were part of secret State Department cables that were leaked to the
columnist Jack Anderson, who published their contents.
The first conversation is beyween Bush and Mahmoud Riad, the Foreign Miniser oif
Egypt. "Ambassador Bush...sought out Formin Riad in UN Indonesian Lounge to discuss
Egytpian draft res re Middle East...Noting that Egyptian draft res appeared from initial
reading to be generally satisfactory,, Bush stated that major stumbling block for USG [ie,
the Nixon regime] was placing of language re Jarring mission in operative paragraph
section...Bush asked if Riad willing to consider removal of this language from operative
section to preamble."
What Bush was clearly trying to do was to weaken the references to Jarring, who was
identified with the idea that the Israelis must quit the occupied territories in order to make
peace possible. The cable continues:
"Riad replied in negative but not before he stressed that for Egyptians inclusion of this
language in operative section not repeat not merely semantic exercise, on contrary, Egypt
convinced that Israel trying to get out of giving favorable reply to Jarring and that only
way to force Israel is by means of explicit UN resolution."
Bush responded to this by making several proposal for minor changes, but then submitted
these to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban. A cable marked "Eyes Only-Specat
Exclusive" describes the Bush-Eban conversation: "Bush...had meeting the Formin Abba
Eban this afternoon...Eban said Israel could not repeat not accept USG proposal...He
noted ...that Jarring has not been too helpful and characterized him as 'negativistic
individual.' On the other hand he opined that if Jarring would would make move toward
Israel 'We'll see what we can do to help him.'" At another meeting between Eban and
Bush, Eban "observed...that on political grounds Israel not have any reference [sic] to
Jarring but appreciated that parliamentary reasons may dictate need for some thing. Both
Eban and Tekoah summed up that from Israel point of view, best course would be to limit
resolution language to 'complimentary reference to Jarring.'"
What all these machinations finally yielded was a resolution that passed with the United
States abstaining and Israel opposed. At the same time, the US promised Israel a