and Slavic masses? The answer to that could only be genocide on a collossal scale, with
economic breakdown, famine, epidemics and pestilence completing the job that war had
begun. If the birth rate of Nigeria seemed destined to catapult that country into second
place among the world demographic powers, the AIDS epidemic in central Africa was
the remedy. General Death was the main ally of the Anglo-Saxons.
Despite these problems, Bush and his co-thinkers were confident that they could
subjugate the planet for a full century. But they had to hurry. Unless the Soviets, Chinese,
Germans, Japanese, and third world powers could be rapidly dealt with, the Anglo-
Americans might be overtaken by their own accelerating economic collapse, and they
might soon find themselves too weak to extend their yoke over the world. The military
machine that attacked Iraq was in the process of shrinking by more than 25% because of
growing American economic weakness, so it was important to act fast.
The Anglo-American system depended on squeezing enough wealth out of the world
economy to feed the insatiable demands of the debt and capital structures in London and
New York. During the 1980's, those capital structures had swelled like malignant tumors,
while the depleted world economy was bled white. Now, crazed after their October 1987
and October 1989 brushes with bottomless financial and currency panic, the masters of
usury in London and New York demanded that the rate of primitive accumulation be
stepped up all over the world. The old Soviet sphere would pass from the frying pan of
the Comecon to the fires of the IMF. By the spring of 1991 Bush would issue his calls for
a free trade zone from the north pole to Tierra del Fuego, and then for world wide free
trade. Bush's handling of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the North
American Free Trade Zone soon convinced the Europe '92 crowd in Brussels that the
Anglo-Americans were hell-bent on global trade war.
These were the impusles and perspectives which impinged on Bush from what he later
called "the Mother Country," and which were vigorously imparted to him in his frequent
consultations with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who now loomed very large
in the configuration of Bush's personal network.
Bush had met Gorbachov in March, 1985, when his "you die, we fly" services were
required for the funeral of old Konstantin Chernenko, the octogenarian symbol of the
impasse of the post-Andropov Kremlin who had ruled the USSR for just 390 days.
Gorbachov had come highly recommended by Margaret Thatcher, with whom he had
become acquainted the previous year. Thatcher had judged the new-look Gorbachov a
man with whom she could do business. Bush came to Moscow bearing an invitation from
Reagan for a parley at the summit; this would later become the choreographed pirouette
of Geneva that November. Bush gave Gorbachov a garbled and oblique endorsement: "If
ever there was a time that we can move forward with progress in the last few years, then I
would say this is a good time for that," stammered Bush. [fn 3] After Geneva there would
follow summits in Iceland in 1986, Washington in 1987 to sign the INF treaty, and then
Reagan's swan song in Moscow in the summer of 1988, a valuable auxiliary to George's
own electioneering. But, as we have seen, the Bush team was contemptuous of slobbering
sentimental old Reagan, a soft touch who let the Russians take him to the cleaners,