If Kuwait had been so vital to the security of the United States and the west, then it is
clear that at any time between July 17 and August 1 --and that is to say during a period of
almost two weeks-- Bush could have issued a warning to Iraq to stay out of Kuwait,
backing it up with some blood-curdling threats and serious, high-profile military
demonstrations. Instead, Bush maintained a studied public silence on the situation and
allowed his ambassador to convey a message to Saddam Hussein that was wholly
misleading, but wholly coherent with the hypothesis of a British plan to sucker Saddam
into war.
On July 24, press releases from the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon
were balanced between support for the "moderate" Kuwaitis and Saudis on the one hand,
and encouragement for an Arab-mediated peaceful settlement. Margaret Tutwiler at the
State Department stressed that the United States had no committment to defend Kuwait:
We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait and there are no special defense or
security committments to Kuwait. We also remain strongly committed to supporting the
individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the gulf, with whom we have deep
and long-standing ties.
An anonymous US military official quoted by the Washington Post added that if Iraq
seized a small amount of Kuwaiti territory as a means of gaining negotiating leverage in
OPEC, "the United States probably would not directly challenge the move, but would
join with all Arab governments in denouncing it and putting pressure on Iraq to back
down." Two US KC-135 air tankers were about to carry out refueling exercises with the
United Arab Emirates Air Force, it was announced, and the six ships of the US Joint Task
Force Middle East based in the Persian Gulf were deployed Monday July 23 for
"communications support" for this air exercise, according to the Pentagon. Two of these
US ships were in the northern Gulf, near the coasts of Iraq and Kuwait. [fn 31] But there
was nothing blood-curdling about any of this, and Bush's personal silence was the most
eloquent of all. In addition, the Bush administration was lobbying in Congress during this
week in opposition to a new round of Congressional trade sanctions against Iraq. Iraqi
capabilities to take Kuwait were now in place, and the Bush regime had not reacted.
On July 25, US Ambassador April Glaspie met with Saddam Hussein, and conveyed a
highly misleading message about the US view of the crisis. Glaspie assured Saddam
Hussein that she was acting on direct instructions from Bush, and then delivered her
celebrated line: "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflict, like your border
disagreement with Kuwait." There is every indication that these were indeed the
instructions that had been given directly by the chief agent provocateur in the White
House, Bush. "I have direct instructions from the president to seek better relations with
Iraq," Glaspie told Saddam. According to the Iraqi transcript of this meeting, Glaspie
stressed that this had always been the US position: "I was in the American embassy in
Kuwait during the late 1960's. The instruction we had during this period was that we
should express no opinion on this issue and the issue is not associated with America." [fn
32] Saddam Hussein illustrated Iraq's economic grievances and need of economic
assistance for postwar reconstruction, points for which Ms. Glaspie expressed full US