against Iraq. The Iraqi invasion was a "totally unjustified act," Bush went on. It was now
imperative that the "international community act together to ensure that Iraqi forces leave
Kuwait immediately. Bush revealed that he and his advisors were now examing the "next
steps" to end the crisis. Bush said he was "somewhat heartened" by his telephone
conversations with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and Gen.
Ali Abdallah Salib of Yemen.
There is every reason to believe that Bush's decision to launch US military intervention
and war was taken in Aspen, under the hypnotic influence of Thatcher. Any residual
hesitancy displayed in secret councils was merely dissembling to prevent his staffs from
opposing that decision. Making a strategic decision of such collossal implications on the
basis of a psycho-manipulative pep talk from Thatcher suggests that Bush's hyperthyroid
condition was already operating; the hyperthyroid patient notoriously tends to resolve
complicated and far-reaching alternatives with quick, snap decisions. Several published
accounts have sought to argue that the decision for large-scale intervention did not come
until Saturday at Camp David, but these accounts belong to the "red Studebaker" school
of coverup. The truth is that Bush went to war as the racist tail on the British imperial
kite, cheered on by the Kissinger cabal that permeated and dominated his administration.
As the London Daily Telegraph gloated, Mrs. Thatcher had "stiffened [Bush's] resolve."
Bush had been scheduled to stay overnight in Aspen, but he now departed immediately
for Washington. Later, the White House said that Bush had been on the phone with Saudi
King Fahd, who had agreed that the Iraqi invasion was "absolutely unacceptable." [fn 35]
On the return trip and through the evening, the Kissingerian operative Scowcroft
continued to to press for military intervention, playing down the difficulties which other
avdisers had been citing. Given Kissinger's long-standing relationship with London and
the Foreign Office, it was no surprise that Scowcroft was fully on the London line.
Before the day was out, "the orders started flooding out of the Oval Office. The president
had all of these diplomatic pieces in his head. The UN piece. The NATO piece. The
Middle east piece. He was meticulous, methodical, and personal," according to one
official. [fn 36]
The next morning was Friday, August 3, and Bush called another NSC meeting at the
White House. The establishment media like the New York Times were full of accounts of
how Iraq was allegedly massing troops along the southern border of Kuwait, about to
pounce on Saudi Arabia. Scowcroft, with Bush's approval, bludgeoned the doubters into a
discussion of war options. Bush ordered the CIA to prepare a plan to overthrow or
assassinate Saddam Hussein, and told Cheney, Powell, and Gen. Schwarzkopf to prepare
military options for the next day. Bush was opening the door to war slowly, so as to keep
all of his civilian and military advisers on board. Later on Friday, Prince Bandar, the
Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington, met with Bush. According to one version,
Bush pledged his word of honor to Bandar that he would "see this through with you."
Bandar was widely reputed to be working for the CIA and other western intelligence
agencies. There were also reports that he had Ethiopian servants in the Saudi embassy in