Washington, near the Kennedy Center, who were chattel slaves according to United
Nations definitions.
When the time came in the afternoon to walk to his helicopter on the White House south
lawn for the short flight to the Camp David retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of
Maryland, Bush stopped at the microphones that were set up there, a procedure that
became a habit during the Gulf crisis. There was something about these moments of
entering and leaving the White House that heightened Bush's psychological instability;
the leaving and arriving rituals would often be the moments of some of his worst public
tantrums. At this point Bush was psyching himself up towards the fit that he would act
out on his Sunday afternoon return. But there was already no doubt that Bush's bellicosity
was rising by the hour. With Kuwait under occupation, he said, "the status quo is
unacceptable and further expansion" by Iraq "would be even more unacceptable." This
formulation already pointed to an advance into Kuwait. He also stressed Saud Arabia: "If
they ask for specific help-- it depends obviously on what it is-- I would be inclined to
help in any way we possibly can." [fn 37]
On Saturday morning, August 4, Bush met with his entourage in Camp David, present
Quayle, Cheney, Sununu, William Webster, Wolfowitz, Baker, Scowcroft, Powell,
Schwarzkopf, Fitzwater, and Richard Haas of the NSC staff. Military advisers, especially
Colin Powell, appear to have directed Bush's attention to the many problems associated
with military intervention. According to one version, Gen. Schwarzkopf estimated that it
would take 17 weeks to move a defensive, deterrent force of 250,000 troops into the
region, and between 8 and 12 months to assemble a ground force capable of driving the
Iraqi army out of Kuwait. For the duration of the crisis, the Army would remain the most
reluctant, while the Air Force, including Scowcroft, would be the most eager to open
hostilities. Bush sensed that he had to stress the defense of Saudi Arabia to keep all of his
bureaucratic players on board, and to garner enough public support to carry out the first
phase of the buildup. Then, perhaps three months down the line, preferably after the
November elections, he could unveil the full offensive buildup that would carry him into
war with Iraq. "That's why our defense of Saudi Arabia has to be our focus," Bush is
reported to have said at this meeting. This remark was calculated to cater to the views of
Gen. Powell, who was thinking primarily in these defensive terms. [fn 38] When the
larger NSC meeting dispersed, Bush met with a more restricted group including Quayle,
Sununu, Baker, Scowcroft, Cheney, Powell, and Webster. This session was dominated by
the fear that the Saudi Arabian monarchy, which would have to be coerced into
agreeement with plans for a US military buildup on its territory, would prefer a
compromise solution negotiated among the Arabs to the Anglo-Saxon war hysteria. The
Saudis were not all as staunch as the American agent Prince Bandar; the presence of large
contingents of infidel ground troops, including Jews and women, would create such
friction with Saudi society as to pose an insoluble political problem. There was great
racist vituperation of the Arabs in general: they could not be trusted, they were easy to
blackmail. This meeting produced a decision that Bush would call Saudi King Fahd and
demand that he accept a large US ground force contingent in addition to aircraft.