solution dead. No greater sabotage of peace efforts in the region could be imagined.
Bush's stress on Kuwait indicates that his subsequent presentation of his troop
deployments as serving the defense of Saudi Arabia was disinformation, and that the US
occupation of Kuwait was his goal all along. Finally, the combination of the manic tone,
the confusion of the two Secretaries General, and the obsessive "I've got to go to work"
repeated three times at the end combine to suggest a state of psychological upheaval, with
the thyroid undoubtedly making its contribution to Bush's flight forward. But, for the
positive side of Bush's ledger, notice that there were no questions about new taxes or Neil
Bush.
"Was Bush's Sunday diatribe staged?", asked the Washington Post some days later. White
House officials denied it. "He did it because he felt that way," said one. "There was no
intention beforehand to assume a posture just for the impact." [fn 43] Dr. Josef Goebbels
was famous for his ability to deliver a speech as if it were a spontaneous emotional
outburst, and the afterward cynically review it point by point and stratagem by stratagem.
There is much evidence that Bush did not possess this degree of lucidity and internal
critical distance.
Bush went into the White House for yet another meeting of the NSC. At this meeting, it
was already a foregone conclusion that there would be a large US military deployment,
although that had never been formally deliberated by the NSC. It had been a solo decision
by Bush. There was now only the formality of Saudi assent.
Monday at the White House was dominated by the presence of Margaret Thatcher at her
staunchest. Thatcher's theme was now that the enforcement of the economic sanctions
voted by the UN would require a naval blockade in which the Anglo-Saxon combined
fleets would play the leading role. Thatcher's first priority was that the sanctions had to
be made to work. But if Washington and London were to conclude that a naval blockade
were necessary for that end, she went on, "you would have to consider such a move."
Thatcher carted out her best Churchillian rhetoric to advertize that Britain already had
one warship stationed in the Persian Gulf, and that two more frigates, one from
Mombassa and one from Malaysia, were on their way. "Those sanctions must be
enforceable," raved Thatcher, who had never accepted economic sanctions against South
Africa. "I cannot remember a time when we had the world so strongly together against an
action as now."
Bush immediately took Thatcher's cue: "We need to discuss full and total implementation
of these sanctions, ruling out nothing at all. These sanctions must be enforced. I think the
will of the nations around the world-- not just the NATO countries-- not just the EC, not
just one area of the world-- the will of the nations around the world will be to enforce
these sanctions. We'll leave the details of how we implement it to the future, but we'll
begin working on that immediately. That's how we go about encouraging others to do that
and what we ourselves should be doing." [fn 44] In the midst of these proceedings,
NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner showed up, and tried his hand at being
staunch, but he could not come close to Thatcher. All of a sudden, the British were at the
center of things again, the most important country, all on the basis of the token forces