there was a "distinct possibility that every unit will not be fully combat-ready until some
time after February 1," or perhaps as late as mid-February." "If the owner asks me if I'm
ready to go, I'd tell him "No, I'm not ready to do the job,'" Waller told the press. It was
understood that Waller was acting as spokesman for a broad stratum of senior officers.
The Bush White House was once again infuriated. "This is not the message we were
trying to send now," said one top Bushman. [fn 71] Waller and the other active duty
officers would henceforth remain silent.
Bush's buildup went on inexorably through the Christmas holidays. In the first week of
the New Year, Bush offered a meeting of Baker and Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi foreign
minister, in Geneva. His ground rules made the meeting pointless even before it
happened: "No negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving and no rewards
for aggression." [fn 72] Bush was showing more of his hand now; the buildup was
approaching what he, if not the generals, thought enough to start bombing Iraq.
The Tariq Aziz-Baker talks in Geneva went on for six hours on January 10, with no
result. Baker was an Al Capone in striped pants; Tariq Aziz expressed himself with great
dignity. Tariq Aziz had made clear that since Israel was in reality an integral part of
Bush's Gulf coalition, it could not be exempt from retaliation if Iraq were to come under
attack. For Bush, when millions of lives were at stake, the issue of greatest moment was a
letter full of threats which Tariq Aziz had read, but refused to accept, and had left lying
on the table in Geneva. (In this letter, which was later released, Bush was revealed as a
megalomaniac who warned Saddam "we stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and
the world," as if Bush were the chief executive of the entire planet.) Here was a new
focus for Bush's apoplectic rage: he had been insulted by this Arab! What about that
letter, the reporters asked. A surfeit of thyroxin coursed through Bush's veins:
Secretary Baker also reported to me that the Iraqi foreign minister rejected my letter to
Saddam Hussein, refused to carry this letter and give it to the president of Iraq. The Iraqi
Ambassador here in Washington did the same thing. This is but one more example that
the Iraqi government is not interested in direct communications designed to settle the
Persian Gulf situation.
But this was a -this was a - a total stiff-arm. This is a total rebuff.
The letter was not rude; the letter was direct. And the letter did exactly what I think is
necessary at this stage. But to refuse to even pass a letter along seems to me to be just one
more manifestation of the stonewalling that has taken place. [fn 73]
The gods were laughing.
The United Nations Security Council resolution, with its approaching artificial deadline
which Bush had demanded, plus the failure of the Baker-Tariq Aziz meeting, on January
9 became the tools of the White House in obtaining a Congressional resolution for war.
Bush was careful to stress his view that he could wage war without the Congress, but that
he was magnanimously letting them express their support for him by approving such a