was to make Iraq accept a pullout so rapid that all equipment and supplies must be left
behind. It is clear that, even if Iraq had accepted Bush's terms, he would have found
reasons to continue the air bombardment. During the following days, the principal
activity of US planes was to bomb columns of Iraqi forces leaving Kuwait and retreating
towards the north, towards Iraq, in exact compliance with the UN resolutions. But Bush
now wanted to fulfill his quota of 100,000 dead Iraqi soldiers. During the evening of
Saturday, February 23, Bush spoke from the White House announcing an order to Gen.
Schwarzkopf to "use all forces, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from
Kuwait." [fn 88] It emerged in retrospect that many Iraqi military units had left Kuwait
weeks before the final land battle. Well-informed observers thought that the Iraqi
Republican Guard had been reduced to less than three functioning combat divisions by
Bush's air and ground assaults, but it shortly became clear that there were at least five
Republican Guard divisions in the field at something approaching full strength. Finally,
on February 27, after 41 days of war, Bush ordered a cease-fire. "Our military objectives
are met," proclaimed Bush. [fn 89]
Because all reports on Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm were covered
by the strictest military censorship, and because most news organizations of the US and
the other coalition states were more than willing to operate under these conditions, most
of the details of these operations are still in the realm of Anglo-American mind war.
The coalition air fleets had carried out some 120,000 sorties against Iraq. If each sortie
had claimed but a single Iraqi life, then 120,000 Iraqis had perished. In reality, total Iraqi
casualties of killed, wounded, and missing, plus the civilian losses from famine, disease,
and pestilence must have been in the neighborhood of 500,000 by the end of 1991.
In early March, Bush addressed a special session of the Congress on what he chose to call
the end of the war. This time it was Bush's personal apotheosis; he was frequently
interrupted by manic applause. Bush's mind war had succeeded. Resistance to the war
had been driven virtually underground; bloodthirsty racism ruled most public discourse
for a time. It was one of the most wretched moments of the American spirit. Bush, who
was consciously preparing new wars, was careful not to promise peace: "Even the new
world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace." Bush now turned his attention to
"the domestic front," where he was quick to make clear that the new world order begins
at home: his main proposal was the administration's omnibus crime bill. One of the main
features of this monstrous legislation was an unprecedented expansion in the use of the
death penalty for a long list of federal crimes. Bush had enjoyed giving international
ultimata so much that he decided to try one on the Congress: "If our forces could win the
ground war in 100 hours, then surely the Congress can pass this legislation in 100 days.
Let that be a promise we make tonight to the American people." [fn 90] Bring the killing
back home, said Bush in effect.
Many commentators, especially Bush's own allies in the neoconservative pro-Zionist
camp, were greatly disappointed that Bush was terminating the hostilities without
liquidating Saddam Hussein, and without guaranteeing the partition of Iraq. Bush was
restrained by a series of considerations. Further penetration into Iraq would have