A Treatise of Human Nature

BOOK I PART IV philosophers, instead of drawing a just infer- ence from this observation, and concluding, that we have no idea o ...

BOOK I PART IV lamentable condition, and such as the poets have given us but a faint notion of in their de- scriptions of the pu ...

BOOK I PART IV only the custom, by which we recal the idea at pleasure; so it naturally happens, that after the frequent use of ...

BOOK I PART IV But among all the instances, wherein the Peripatetics have shewn they were guided by every trivial propensity of ...

BOOK I PART IV fancy: But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers in so signal a weakness? ...

BOOK I PART IV SECTIONIV. OF THEMODERNPHILOSOPHY But here it may be objected, that the imag- ination, according to my own confes ...

BOOK I PART IV are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor nec- essary, or so much as useful in the conduct of life; but on the cont ...

BOOK I PART IV malady is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, though it be contrary to health, the most agreeable ...

BOOK I PART IV phy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but ...

BOOK I PART IV change according to the distance of the clouds, and according to the angle they make with the eye and luminous bo ...

BOOK I PART IV like causes. Many of the impressions of colour, sound, &c. are confest to be nothing but inter- nal existence ...

BOOK I PART IV ifications; figure, motion, gravity, and cohe- sion. The generation, encrease, decay, and cor- ruption of animals ...

BOOK I PART IV agant scepticism concerning them. If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely percep- tions, nothing we can ...

BOOK I PART IV true with regard to extension; and have shewn that it is impossible to conceive extension, but as composed of par ...

BOOK I PART IV not penetrate each other; but still maintain a separate and distinct existence. Solidity, there- fore, is perfect ...

BOOK I PART IV sive to every one that comprehends it; but be- cause it may seem abstruse and intricate to the generality of read ...

BOOK I PART IV a circle. Extension must necessarily be consid- ered either as coloured, which is a false idea; I or as solid, wh ...

BOOK I PART IV conceived to exist, by itself: but necessarily re- quires some object or real existence, to which it may belong. ...

BOOK I PART IV we naturally imagine, that we feel the solidity of bodies, and need but touch any object in or- der to perceive t ...

BOOK I PART IV that the sensation, motion, and resistance are any ways resembling. Secondly, The impressions of touch are sim- p ...