BOOK I PART II
and incapable of being resolved into any lesser
unity.
All this reasoning takes place with regard
to time; along with an additional argument,
which it may be proper to take notice of. It is a
property inseparable from time, and which in a
manner constitutes its essence, that each of its
parts succeeds another, and that none of them,
however contiguous, can ever be co-existent.
For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot
concur with the present year 1738 every mo-
ment must be distinct from, and posterior or
antecedent to another. It is certain then, that
time, as it exists, must be composed of indivis-
ible moments. For if in time we could never
arrive at an end of division, and if each mo-
ment, as it succeeds another, were not perfectly
single and indivisible, there would be an infi-