BOOK II PART III
cerning them. Now I assert, that whoever rea-
sons after this manner, does ipso facto believe
the actions of the will to arise from necessity,
and that he knows not what he means, when
he denies it.
All those objects, of which we call the one
cause and the other effect, considered in them-
selves, are as distinct and separate from each
other, as any two things in nature, nor can we
ever, by the most accurate survey of them, in-
fer the existence of the one from that of the
other. It is only from experience and the obser-
vation of their constant union, that we are able
to form this inference; and even after all, the in-
ference is nothing but the effects of custom on
the imagination. We must not here be content
with saying, that the idea of cause and effect
arises from objects constantly united; but must