BOOK II PART III
is from thence we proceed to the conception of
any distant object. When the object is past, the
progression of the thought in passing to it from
the present is contrary to nature, as proceeding
from one point of time to that which is preced-
ing, and from that to another preceding, in op-
position to the natural course of the succession.
On the other hand, when we turn our thought
to a future object, our fancy flows along the
stream of time, and arrives at the object by
an order, which seems most natural, passing
always from one point of time to that which
is immediately posterior to it. This easy pro-
gression of ideas favours the imagination, and
makes it conceive its object in a stronger and
fuller light, than when we are continually op-
posed in our passage, and are obliged to over-
come the difficulties arising from the natural
propensity of the fancy. A small degree of dis-