BOOK I PART II
are joined in impression, be inseparable in idea,
we need only consider, if they be different from
each other; in which case, it is plain they may
be conceived apart. Every thing, that is dif-
ferent is distinguishable: and everything, that
is distinguishable, may be separated, accord-
ing to the maxims above-explained. If on the
contrary they be not different, they are not dis-
tinguishable: and if they be not distinguish-
able, they cannot be separated. But this is pre-
cisely the case with respect to time, compared
with our successive perceptions. The idea of
time is not derived from a particular impres-
sion mixed up with others, and plainly dis-
tinguishable from them; but arises altogether
from the manner, in which impressions appear
to the mind, without making one of the num-
ber. Five notes played on a flute give us the im-
pression and idea of time; though time be not