BOOK I PART II
other objects. The ideas of some objects it cer-
tainly must have, nor is it possible for it with-
out these ideas ever to arrive at any conception
of time; which since it, appears not as any pri-
mary distinct impression, can plainly be noth-
ing but different ideas, or impressions, or ob-
jects disposed in a certain manner, that is, suc-
ceeding each other.
I know there are some who pretend, that the
idea of duration is applicable in a proper sense
to objects, which are perfectly unchangeable;
and this I take to be the common opinion of
philosophers as well as of the vulgar. But to
be convinced of its falsehood we need but re-
flect on the foregoing conclusion, that the idea
of duration is always derived from a succession
of changeable objects, and can never be con-
veyed to the mind by any thing stedfast and