BOOK I PART II
divisible. This argument may be worth the ex-
amining.
Every idea, that is distinguishable, being
also separable, let us take one of those simple
indivisible ideas, of which the compound one
of extension is formed, and separating it from
all others, and considering it apart, let us form
a judgment of its nature and qualities.
It is plain it is not the idea of extension. For
the idea of extension consists of parts; and this
idea, according to t-he supposition, is perfectly
simple and indivisible. Is it therefore nothing?
That is absolutely impossible. For as the com-
pound idea of extension, which is real, is com-
posed of such ideas; were these so many non-
entities, there would be a real existence com-
posed of non-entities; which is absurd. Here
therefore I must ask, What is our idea of a sim-