BOOK III PART I
has an influence upon our actions, of which
reason alone is incapable. Reason and judg-
ment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an
action, by prompting, or by directing a passion:
But it is not pretended, that a judgment of this
kind, either in its truth or falshood, is attended
with virtue or vice. And as to the judgments,
which are caused by our judgments, they can
still less bestow those moral qualities on the ac-
tions, which are their causes.
But to be more particular, and to shew, that
those eternal immutable fitnesses and unfit-
nesses of things cannot be defended by sound
philosophy, we may weigh the following con-
siderations.
If the thought and understanding were alone
capable of fixing the boundaries of right and
wrong, the character of virtuous and vicious