BOOK III PART I
applicable, not only to an irrational, but also to
an inanimate object; it follows, that even such
objects must be susceptible of merit or demerit.
Resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and
proportions in quantitiy and number; all these re-
lations belong as properly to matter, as to our
actions, passions, and volitions. It is unques-
tionable, therefore, that morality lies not in any
of these relations, nor the sense of it in their dis-
covery.^13
(^13) As a proof, how confused our way of thinking on
this subject commonly is, we may observe, that those
who assert, that morality is demonstrable, do not say,
that morality lies in the relations, and that the relations
are distinguishable by reason. They only say, that rea-
son can discover such an action, In such relations, to
be virtuous, and such another vicious. It seems they
thought it sufficient, if they could bring the word, Rela-
tion, into the proposition, without troubling themselves