BOOK III PART I
things, it is not only supposed, that these re-
lations, being eternal and immutable, are the
same, when considered by every rational crea-
ture, but their effects are also supposed to be
necessarily the same; and it is concluded they
have no less, or rather a greater, influence in di-
recting the will of the deity, than in governing
the rational and virtuous of our own species.
These two particulars are evidently distinct. It
is one thing to know virtue, and another to
conform the will to it. In order, therefore, to
prove, that the measures of right and wrong
are eternal laws, obligatory on every rational
mind, it is not sufficient to shew the relations
upon which they are founded: We must also
point out the connexion betwixt the relation
and the will; and must prove that this connex-
ion is so necessary, that in every well-disposed
mind, it must take place and have its influence;