BOOK III PART I
may, in like manner, be objected to the present
system, that if virtue and vice be determined
by pleasure and pain, these qualities must,
in every case, arise from the sensations; and
consequently any object, whether animate or
inanimate, rational or irrational, might become
morally good or evil, provided it can excite a
satisfaction or uneasiness. But though this ob-
jection seems to be the very same, it has by
no means the same force, in the one case as
in the other. For, first, tis evident, that under
the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations,
which are very different from each other, and
which have only such a distant resemblance,
as is requisite to make them be expressed by
the same abstract term. A good composition of
music and a bottle of good wine equally pro-
duce pleasure; and what is more, their good-
ness is determined merely by the pleasure. But