BOOK I PART II
wherever objects are different, they are distin-
guishable and separable by the imagination.
II. The second objection is derived from the
necessity there would be ofpenetration, if exten-
sion consisted of mathematical points. A sim-
ple and indivisible atom, that touches another,
must necessarily penetrate it; for it is impossi-
ble it can touch it by its external parts, from the
very supposition of its perfect simplicity, which
excludes all parts. It must therefore touch it
intimately, and in its whole essence,secundum
se, tota, et totaliter; which is the very defini-
tion of penetration. But penetration is impos-
sible: Mathematical points are of consequence
equally impossible.
I answer this objection by substituting a
juster idea of penetration. Suppose two bodies
containing no void within their circumference,