BOOK III PART II
In vain should we expect to find, in unculti-
vated nature, a remedy to this inconvenience;
or hope for any inartificial principle of the hu-
man mind, which might controul those partial
affections, and make us overcome the tempta-
tions arising from our circumstances. The idea
of justice can never serve to this purpose, or
be taken for a natural principle, capable of in-
spiring men with an equitable conduct towards
each other. That virtue, as it is now understood,
would never have been dreamed of among
rude and savage men. For the notion of injury
or injustice implies an immorality or vice com-
mitted against some other person: And as ev-
ery immorality is derived from some defect or
unsoundness of the passions, and as this defect
must be judged of, in a great measure, from the
ordinary course of nature in the constitution of
the mind; it will be easy to know, whether we