BOOK III PART II
of virtue is derived from reason, to shew the
change which this must produce in the rela-
tions and ideas. But it is evident, that the
only cause, why the extensive generosity of
man, and the perfect abundance of every thing,
would destroy the very idea of justice, is be-
cause they render it useless; and that, on the
other hand, his confined benevolence, and his
necessitous condition, give rise to that virtue,
only by making it requisite to the publick inter-
est, and to that of every individual. Twas there-
fore a concern for our own, and the publick
interest, which made us establish the laws of
justice; and nothing can be more certain, than
that it is not any relation of ideas, which gives
us this concern, but our impressions and senti-
ments, without which every thing in nature is
perfectly indifferent to us, and can never in the
least affect us. The sense of justice, therefore, is