BOOK I PART II
other supposition than that of the composi-
tion of extension by indivisible points or atoms.
How else coued any thing exist without length,
without breadth, or without depth?
Two different answers, I find, have been
made to this argument; neither of which is in
my opinion satisfactory. The first is, that the
objects of geometry, those surfaces, lines and
points, whose proportions and positions it ex-
amines, are mere ideas in the mind; I and not
only never did, but never can exist in nature.
They never did exist; for no one will pretend
to draw a line or make a surface entirely con-
formable to the definition: They never can ex-
ist; for we may produce demonstrations from
these very ideas to prove, that they are impos-
sible.
But can anything be imagined more absurd