BOOK I PART II
breadth, yet by an abstraction without a sep-
aration, we can consider the one without re-
garding the other; in the same manner as we
may think of the length of the way betwixt two
towns, and overlook its breadth. The length
is inseparable from the breadth both in nature
and in our minds; but this excludes not a par-
tial consideration, and a distinction of reason,
after the manner above explained.
In refuting this answer I shall not insist on
the argument, which I have already sufficiently
explained, that if it be impossible for the mind
to arrive at a minimum in its ideas, its capacity
must be infinite, in order to comprehend the in-
finite number of parts, of which its idea of any
extension would be composed. I shall here en-
deavour to find some new absurdities in this
reasoning.