BOOK I PART II
A surface terminates a solid; a line termi-
nates a surface; a point terminates a line; but I
assert, that if the ideas of a point, line or surface
were not indivisible, it is impossible we should
ever conceive these terminations: For let these
ideas be supposed infinitely divisible; and then
let the fancy endeavour to fix itself on the idea
of the last surface, line or point; it immediately
finds this idea to break into parts; and upon its
seizing the last of these parts, it loses its hold by
a new division, and so on in infinitum, without
any possibility of its arriving at a concluding
idea. The number of fractions bring it no nearer
the last division, than the first idea it formed.
Every particle eludes the grasp by a new frac-
tion; like quicksilver, when we endeavour to
seize it. But as in fact there must be something,
which terminates the idea of every finite quan-
tity; and as this terminating idea cannot itself