BOOK III PART II
and perpetual will of giving every one his due.
In this definition it is supposed, that there are
such things as right and property, independent
of justice, and antecedent to it; and that they
would have subsisted, though men had never
dreamt of practising such a virtue. I have al-
ready observed, in a cursory manner, the fal-
lacy of this opinion, and shall here continue to
open up a little more distinctly my sentiments
on that subject.
I shall begin with observing, that this qual-
ity, which we shall call property, is like many of
the imaginary qualities of the peripatetic phi-
losophy, and vanishes upon a more accurate
inspection into the subject, when considered a-
part from our moral sentiments. It is evident
property does not consist in any of the sensi-
ble qualities of the object. For these may con-