BOOK I PART II
ity is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a
property in the figures themselves, but arises
merely from the comparison, which the mind
makes betwixt them. If it consists, therefore,
in this imaginary application and mutual con-
tact of parts, we must at least have a distinct
notion of these parts, and must conceive their
contact. Now it is plain, that in this conception
we would run up these parts to the greatest
minuteness, which can possibly be conceived;
since the contact of large parts would never
render the figures equal. But the minutest parts
we can conceive are mathematical points; and
consequently this standard of equality is the
same with that derived from the equality of the
number of points; which we have already de-
termined to be a just but an useless standard.
We must therefore look to some other quarter
for a solution of the present difficulty.