BOOK III PART II
tion of moral good and evil is founded on the
pleasure or pain, which results from the view
of any sentiment, or character; and as that plea-
sure or pain cannot be unknown to the per-
son who feels it, it follows^22 , that there is just
so much vice or virtue in any character, as ev-
ery one places in it, and that it is impossible in
this particular we can ever be mistaken. And
though our judgments concerning the origin of
any vice or virtue, be not so certain as those
concerning their degrees; yet, since the ques-
(^22) This proposition must hold strictly true, with re-
gard to every quality, that is determin’d merely by sen-
timent. In what sense we can talk either of a right or
a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty, shall be
considerd afterwards. In the mean time, it may be ob-
serv’d, that there is such an uniformity in the GENERAL
sentiments of mankind, as to render such questions of
but small importance.