BOOK III PART III
pendence on the principle of sympathy so of-
ten insisted on. We approve of a person, who
is possessed of qualities immediately agreeable
to those, with whom he has any commerce;
though perhaps we ourselves never reaped any
pleasure from them. We also approve of one,
who is possessed of qualities, that are imme-
diately agreeable to himself; though they be of
no service to any mortal. To account for this we
must have recourse to the foregoing principles.
Thus, to take a general review of the present
hypothesis: Every quality of the mind is de-
nominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by
the mere survey; as every quality, which pro-
duces pain, is called vicious. This pleasure and
this pain may arise from four different sources.
For we reap a pleasure from the view of a char-
acter, which is naturally fitted to be useful to