BOOK III PART III
The second principle I shall take notice of
is that of comparison, or the variation of our
judgments concerning ob jects, according to the
proportion they bear to those with which we
compare them. We judge more, of objects by
comparison, than by their intrinsic worth and
value; and regard every thing as mean, when
set in opposition to what is superior of the
same kind. But no comparison is more obvious
than that with ourselves; and hence it is that
on all occasions it takes place, and mixes with
most of our passions. This kind of comparison
is directly contrary to sympathy in its opera-
tion, as we have observed in treating of com
passion and malice. (Book II. Part II. Sect. VIII.)
In all kinds of comparison an object makes us al-
ways receive from another, to which it is compared,
a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its
direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of