APPENDIX
ney, or the events of any history. Every partic-
ular fact is there the object of belief. Its idea is
modified differently from the loose reveries of
a castle-builder: But no distinct impression at-
tends every distinct idea, or conception of mat-
ter of fact. This is the subject of plain experi-
ence. If ever this experience can be disputed
on any occasion, it is when the mind has been
agitated with doubts and difficulties; and after-
wards, upon taking the object in a new point of
view, or being presented with a new argument,
fixes and reposes itself in one settled conclu-
sion and belief. In this case there is a feeling
distinct and separate from the conception. The
passage from doubt and agitation to tranquility
and repose, conveys a satisfaction and pleasure
to the mind. But take any other case. Suppose
I see the legs and thighs of a person in motion,
while some interposed object conceals the rest