BOOK I PART II
duce the figures of poets and orators, as suffi-
cient proofs of this, were it as usual, as it is rea-
sonable, in metaphysical subjects to draw our
arguments from that quarter. But lest meta-
physicians should esteem this below their dig-
nity, I shall borrow a proof from an observa-
tion, which may be made on most of their own
discourses, viz. that it is usual for men to use
words for ideas, and to talk instead of thinking
in their reasonings. We use words for ideas, be-
cause they are commonly so closely connected
that the mind easily mistakes them. And this
likewise is the reason, why we substitute the
idea of a distance, which is not considered ei-
ther as visible or tangible, in the room of exten-
sion, which is nothing but a composition of vis-
ible or tangible points disposed in a certain or-
der. In causing this mistake there concur both
the relations of causation and resemblance. As