BOOK I PART II
one instance at least, that they have met with
success. But at present I content myself with
knowing perfectly the manner in which objects
affect my senses, and their connections with
each other, as far as experience informs me of
them. This suffices for the conduct of life; and
this also suffices for my philosophy, which pre-
tends only to explain the nature and causes of
our perceptions, or impressions and idea^4
(^4) As long as we confine our speculations to the ap-
pearances of objects to our senses, without entering into
disquisitions concerning their real nature and opera-
tions, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never
be embarrassed by any question. Thus, if it be asked,
if the invisible and intangible distance, interposed be-
twixt two objects, be something or nothing: It is easy to
answer, that it issomething, viz.a property of the objects,
which affect thesensesafter such a particular manner. If
it be asked whether two objects, having such a distance
betwixt them, touch or not: it may be answered, that this