BOOK I PART II
pute and reason concerning it; we must for the
same reason have the idea of time without any
changeable existence; since there is no subject
of dispute more frequent and common. But
that we really have no such idea, is certain.
For whence should it be derived? Does it arise
from an impression of sensation or of reflec-
tion? Point it out distinctly to us, that we may
know its nature and qualities. But if you cannot
point out any such impression, you may be cer-
tain you are mistaken, when you imagine you
have any such idea.
But though it be impossible to shew the im-
pression, from which the idea of time with-
out a changeable existence is derived; yet we
can easily point out those appearances, which
make us fancy we have that idea. For we may
observe, that there is a continual succession of