BOOK I PART II
that since we never remember any idea or im-
pression without attributing existence to it, the
idea of existence must either be derived from a
distinct impression, conjoined with every per-
ception or object of our thought, or must be the
very same with the idea of the perception or
object.
As this dilemma is an evident consequence
of the principle, that every idea arises from a
similar impression, so our decision betwixt the
propositions of the dilemma is no more doubt-
ful. So far from there being any distinct impres-
sion, attending every impression and every
idea, that I do not think there are any two dis-
tinct impressions, which are inseparably con-
joined. Though certain sensations may at one
time be united, we quickly find they admit of a
separation, and may be presented apart. And