BOOK I PART III
SECTIONVI. OF THEINFERENCE FROM THE
IMPRESSION TO THEIDEA
It is easy to observe, that in tracing this rela-
tion, the inference we draw from cause to ef-
fect, is not derived merely from a survey of
these particular objects, and from such a pen-
etration into their essences as may discover
the dependance of the one upon the other.
There is no object, which implies the existence
of any other if we consider these objects in
themselves, and never look beyond the ideas
which we form of them. Such an inference
would amount to knowledge, and would im-
ply the absolute contradiction and impossibil-
ity of conceiving any thing different. But as all
distinct ideas are separable, it is evident there
can be no impossibility of that kind. When we
pass from a present impression to the idea of