BOOK I PART III
same principle cannot be both the cause and
effect of another; and this is, perhaps, the only
proposition concerning that relation, which is
either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Should any one think to elude this argument;
and without determining whether our reason-
ing on this subject be derived from demonstra-
tion or probability, pretend that all conclusions
from causes and effects are built on solid rea-
soning: I can only desire, that this reasoning
may be produced, in order to be exposed to our
examination. It may, perhaps, be said, that after
experience of the constant conjunction of cer-
tain objects, we reason in the following man-
ner. Such an object is always found to produce
another. It is impossible it coued have this ef-
fect, if it was not endowed with a power of
production. The power necessarily implies the