BOOK I PART III
dowed with such a power; but can never prove,
that the same power must continue in the same
object or collection of sensible qualities; much
less, that a like power is always conjoined with
like sensible qualities, should it be said, that we
have experience, that the same power contin-
ues united with the same object, and that like
objects are endowed with like powers, I would
renew my question, why from this experience
we form any conclusion beyond those past in-
stances, of which we have had experience. If
you answer this question in, the same manner
as the preceding, your answer gives still occa-
sion to a new question of the same kind, even in
infinitum; which clearly proves, that the fore-
going reasoning had no just foundation.
Thus not only our reason fails us in the dis-
covery of the ultimate connexion of causes and