BOOK I PART III
which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie
in the manner, in which we conceive it.
Suppose a person present with me, who
advances propositions, to which I do not as-
sent, that Caesar dyed in his bed, that silver
is more fusible, than lead, or mercury heav-
ier than gold; it is evident, that notwithstand-
ing my incredulity, I clearly understand his
meaning, and form all the same ideas, which
he forms. My imagination is endowed with
the same powers as his; nor is it possible for
him to conceive any idea, which I cannot con-
ceive; nor conjoin any, which I cannot con-
join. I therefore ask, Wherein consists the dif-
ference betwixt believing and disbelieving any
proposition? The answer is easy with regard
to propositions, that are proved by intuition or
demonstration. In that case, the person, who